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 THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS: A HYBRID 
APPROACH TO TRADE SECRET LEGAL THEORY 
 
Jonathan R.K. Stroud 
 
INTRODUCTION 
If you say my name, then I am gone.1 
 
The current legal theories explaining U.S. trade secret law incompletely 
and inadequately explain the law’s existence, utility, and justification. 
Academics and the courts continue to debate theories supporting trade secret 
protection sounding in tort, contract, or property. This results in confusion, 
uneven judicial enforcement, and uncertainty. What is protected? Will it be 
enforced? Rights-holders do not have the answers. 
The academy’s failure to adequately explain the policy governing trade 
secret law confuses innovators as to what is protected, how, and why. This leads 
directly to the loss of substantial investment in innovation. Thus, state trade 
secret laws as explained by existing theories are inefficient, reactionary, and 
largely illusory. This Article presents a better approach. 
Trade secret law encourages companies to innovate by providing 
protection not offered by other forms of intellectual property rights. The laws 
ostensibly serve to recoup time and money spent pursuing innovation or 
investment—innovation or investment that may benefit the greater public good. 
Without strong trade secret protection, the “tragedy of the commons” leads to 
the unfair destruction of the fruits of capital and labor and discourages 
investment in activities calculated to benefit the public.2 
  
 Copyright © 2013, Jonathan R.K. Stroud; Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
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throughout the years; former Administrative Law Judge Robert K. Rogers, for the same; 
Professor Jonas Anderson, for his excellent trade secret class, his constant availability, 
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 1 LA VITA È BELLA (Miramax Films 1997). 
 2 See infra Part I. 
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This Article’s examination of trade secret protection begins with a 
discussion of the legal and theoretical backgrounds of trade secret law in Part I. 
Next, Part II argues that both the property and contract theories behind trade 
secret law fail to adequately protect innovation and investment because they 
generally require privity and only act retrospectively to compensate for trade 
secret misappropriation. Finally, Part III proposes a hybrid property theory that 
blends elements of both property and tort trade secret theories in an attempt to 
recalibrate the incentives U.S. law offers innovators in the Internet age. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Legal Basics of Trade Secrets3 
State common law and state statutes represent the vast majority of the 
body of trade secret law in the United States.4 Today, the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act (UTSA)5 and/or some form of the Restatements of Law6 have influenced 
nearly all state trade secret law.7 Forty-eight states and the International Trade 
Commission (ITC)8 rely in some way on the UTSA for guidance.9 The UTSA 
defines a trade secret as: 
[I]nformation . . . [that] derives independent economic value, actual or po-
tential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascer-
tainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic val-
ue from its disclosure or use, and . . . is the subject of efforts that are rea-
sonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.10 
The UTSA’s analysis of trade secret violations has four elements: (1) subject 
matter (i.e., there is a secret), (2) commercial value; (3) reasonable measures to 
keep secret; and (4) acquisition through improper means. 
  
 3 Note that the background section is derived and paraphrased from, and 
substantially repeated elsewhere in, my published literature, most notably in Jonathan 
R.K. Stroud & P. Andrew Riley, Trade Secrets at the International Trade Commission: A 
Survey, 15 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 21 (forthcoming Nov. 2013). 
 4 Some federal statutes ostensibly govern or incorporate elements of trade secret 
protection. The Economic Espionage Act most notably governs criminal penalties for 
trade secret violations, with a focus on international espionage. A more complete 
discussion of the federal statutes and remedies is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 5 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005). 
 6 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1939); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION (1995). 
 7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (1995). 
 8 See infra Part II. 
 9 Texas became the forty-eighth state to adopt trade secret protection in May of 2013 
when it passed the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.002 (West 2013). 
 10 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). 




The so-called Restatements definition of trade secrets, derived from the 
now-defunct Restatement of Torts,11 uses a more subjective balancing test. A 
trade secret under the Restatement of Torts was “any formula, pattern, device,” 
or otherwise, that is secret and is not a matter “of public knowledge.”12 That 
definition has been expanded to now include “any information that can be used 
in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable 
and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.” 13 
The old Restatement of Torts definition balanced the following six 
factors: 
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of [the plaintiff’s] 
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others in-
volved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard 
the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and 
to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in 
developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the 
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.14 
The misappropriation of a trade secret generally requires a confidential 
relationship between an employer and an employee, and a breach of that 
confidence. 
B. The Current Theoretical Bases of Trade Secrets 
The academy and the courts generally agree that “[t]he law governing 
protection of trade secrets essentially is designed to regulate unfair business 
competition.”15 Judges and scholars have argued that trade secret actions are 
based variously in tort, contract, and property law theories.16 Unfortunately, 
courts, scholars, and other legal authorities disagree on which theory should 
control. For instance, according to one leading treatise, “the basis for trade 
secret protection rests on both property and tort theories, in which a plaintiff 
must establish the existence of a trade secret and the fact of misconduct by the 
defendant.”17 
As stated above, state law seeks to provide a remedy for acts of unfair 
competition perpetrated against companies acting in good faith.18 It balances the 
employer’s right to enjoy the fruits of his capital investment against the laborer’s 
  
 11 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1939). 
 12 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939). 
 13 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). 
 14 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
 15 Univ. Computing v. Lykes–Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 539 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 16 But see Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 428 (1995) (“this cause of action more closely resembles a 
property right than an ordinary tort”). 
 17 PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTIES & INTANGIBLE ASSETS ¶ 4.01 (2012). 
 18 See Univ. Computing, 504 F.2d at 539; see also supra text accompanying note 14. 
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interests in mobility and retention of acquired skills and knowledge. The 
tort/contract “relationship” theory and the “property” theory dominate the 
discussion. Neither theory alone sufficiently justifies the law or rewards 
innovation and investment. 
Both dominant theories—the relationship and property theories—arise 
from the social contract theories of the renaissance. The work of the 
philosophers John Locke and Adam Smith exemplify these social contract 
theories. John Locke developed the labor theory of acquisition, which advocated 
for a system where individuals could retain property rights in the fruits of their 
labor as the most efficient means of encouraging such labor.19 Adam Smith 
argued instead that property rights are the only efficient means to avoid the 
inefficient “tragedy of the commons,” whereby all rational yet self-interested 
actors in a system will deplete or destroy resources to their immediate benefit, 
but ultimately hurt the long-term interests of the state.20 Thus, both a relationship 
approach emphasizing the natural rights of the two parties at issue and a 
property approach emphasizing the rights of the individual vis-à-vis the state 
share the same common theoretical root—a social contract theory based on 
efficiently rewarding labor by awarding rights to the fruits of that labor. 
C. Tort/Contract Theory of Trade Secrets—Relationships 
The tort and contract theories of trade secrets are closely linked in that 
they both root in equity as protecting the parties’ natural rights—Locke’s “life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of property.”21 Tort law rests on relationships between 
parties and the subsequent duty to bear the costs of any harm inflicted; contract 
law expressly recognizes the parties’ intent to create such a relationship. 
In trade secret law, the relationship theory focuses on balancing the 
employer’s rights with that of the employee, and is less concerned with the 
larger aspects of social innovation and economic growth. For instance, some 
courts have concluded that a party given access to a trade secret through 
confidential disclosures may still be held to have misappropriated the trade 
secret, even after general publication,22 and even in situations where the secret 
was not truly “secret” to begin with.23 For example, a Pennsylvania court 
applying the relationship theory held that ingenious shipping containers could be 
protected, despite the fact that the design made the “secret” readily apparent to 
  
 19 JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
 20 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS, BK. I, CH. II (Prometheus Books Pub. 1991) (1776) (explaining at length the 
“tragedy of the commons” problem inherent in nature). The term “tragedy of the 
commons” was later developed in an influential essay by ecologist Garrett Hardin. See 
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
 21 LOCKE, supra note 19, §§ 87, 123, 209, 222. 
 22 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Medtronic, Inc., 686 F.2d 1219, 1228 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(applying Minnesota law). 
 23 See infra note 25 and accompanying text. 




anyone seeking to reverse-engineer the devices.24 Thus, the bad acts of the 
misappropriator could be punished, despite the lack of an actual “secret from 
society” in general, because of the privity between parties and the duty owed to 
the employer. Had the case been brought against a third-party purchaser of the 
“secret,” however, the plaintiffs would have lost under a pure relationship 
theory. 
D. The Property Theory of Trade Secrets—Rights Against the World 
A true property theory, instead, is rooted in the party’s relationship with 
the state. This true “social contract” theory seeks to reward individual actors for 
innovation, expense, and labor, at the immediate expense—but long-term gain—
of other parties.25 The state rewards individual innovation, knowledge, and labor 
in the short-term in exchange for the long-term benefit to society. 
This theory directly confronts the “tragedy of the commons” problem, 
and is the basis of patent law.26 For instance, if an employee who steals the trade 
secret publishes it to the world (e.g., posts it on the Internet or otherwise 
publicly discloses it), all rational businesses would use the publicly available 
information to compete. The competition almost always drives prices so low that 
no one innovator could recoup research and development costs. The disclosure 
destroys the incentive to innovate or invest—the tragedy—by the rational 
market actions of others—the commons. A property right in the fruits of that 
innovation or investment counterbalances the problem by preventing rational 
market actors from destroying the socially beneficial incentive—one they, too, 
would like to utilize if the situation was reversed. 
Thus, a true effectual property regime in trade secrets would proscribe 
rigid categories of invention, and reward innovators for the fruits of their labor 
with a right to exclude any others not independently developing those rights. 
The more-rigid UTSA definition of trade secrets is ostensibly a property 
theory, encouraging protectable, proscribable assets in an attempt to offset the 
machinations of the tragedy of the commons. However, the traditional property 
theory of trade secrets contains one major flaw. Applying (perhaps erroneously) 
this strict property theory of trade secrets conjunctively and prospectively (i.e., 
reading the UTSA as requiring the four elements listed below to be both 
  
 24 Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373–74 (7th Cir. 1953). 
 25 See Pace, supra note 16, at 428 (“[T]he prevailing modern justification for 
protecting against trade secret misappropriation is that such protection permits businesses 
to reap the benefits of their activities—again a property concept distinguishable from the 
usual tort justification of requiring persons to bear the costs of their harmful activities.”). 
 26 The theory traces back to Aristotle: “That which is common to the greatest number 
has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of 
the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual.” 
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, BK. II, CH. III 17 (BENJAMIN JOWETT trans., THE POLITICS OF 
ARISTOTLE: TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH WITH INTRODUCTION, MARGINAL ANALYSIS, 
ESSAYS, NOTES AND INDICES, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1885) (384–322 BC). 
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contemporaneous with the use of the subject matter by another and that it 
currently be secret), courts have held that once bad actors publish secret 
material, it ceases to be secret, thereby destroying any value.27 
Recall that the UTSA approach has four elements: (1) subject matter (i.e., 
there is a secret), (2) commercial value; (3) reasonable measures to keep secret; 
and (4) acquisition through improper means. Thus, if a chemical formula was 
secret, had value, and the innovator had used reasonable measures to keep it 
secret, the disclosure of the secret originally through improper means should not 
destroy the owner’s right against the world prospectively. 
Instead, courts have ruled that once a secret is initially “disclosed,” any 
further right is destroyed beyond the original instance.28 Applying such a strict 
secret subject-matter understanding of trade secrets under the UTSA in such a 
manner fundamentally misunderstands the goals for and reasoning behind a 
property-based regime. The UTSA’s “secret” requirement should not be used to 
prospectively limit recovery. 
II. ARGUMENT: BOTH THEORIES ARE IMPERFECT 
The relationship theory and property theory, taken separately and strictly 
applied, inadequately protect substantial investment in innovation by limiting 
prospective rights in trade secrets. They do so in two problematic ways. First, 
the relationship theory generally requires privity between employer and the 
employee–misappropriator. The privity requirement limits recovery to those 
immediately involved in the transaction and limits the scope of relief, destroying 
the social incentive to innovate and/or invest. 
Second, both theories act retroactively to compensate “victims” and do 
not adequately apply prospectively. Courts limit exclusionary remedies to the 
parties involved in the lawsuit currently, and in general fail to protect a right 
once a bad actor publishes a secret. 
Two key modern developments render each theory inadequate: first, the 
ease of Internet publication (and thus worldwide destruction of secrecy)29; and 
second, the international practice of patent application publication. 
Both create new problems rendering traditional trade secret protections 
valueless. If a single misappropriator or other third party can destroy the 
prospective value of a secret instantly and cheaply via the internet, court 
judgments against the misappropriator will drastically undercompensate the 
  
 27 See, e.g., Group One v. Hallmark Cards, 254 F.3d 1041, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(applying Missouri law and finding that a prior PCT publication destroyed any trade 
secret right); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, 332 N.W. 2d 890, 897 n.5 (Minn. 
1983) (disagreeing with Goldberg, 686 F.2d at 1227). 
 28 Cf. Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104, 108 (7th Cir. 1937) 
(enjoining potential licensee from using licensor’s trade secret process after disclosure, 
but only because the enjoined party had misappropriated the now-disclosed process prior 
to disclosure). 
 29 See Bruce T. Atkins, Note, Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade 
Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1151, 1161 (1996). 




innovator for his or her lost rights and value against the world. Recent examples 
illustrating the value of stolen trade secrets include single employees stealing 
secrets worth $50 million, $400 million, or more.30 The likelihood that a single 
actor has the means or ability to repay an innovator company, even if caught, is 
small. If the trade secret is disclosed in a published patent application, the 
publication will likely be permanent and irreversible. 
Thus, downstream effects now dominate the equation31 and demand a new 
theory and policy. In the Internet age and with public patent application 
publication, privity matters far less than it once did.  An “innocent’ third party 
should not reap a windfall based on a privity party’s bad action. This is 
particularly true when the means of publication to the world is an officially 
sanctioned irreversible publication, such as a patent application. 
Take the case of In re Rubber Resins and Processes for Manufacturing 
Same.32 Rubber Resins, an ongoing ITC trade secret “§ 337” investigation, 
involves a highly valuable chemical manufacturing process for commercial-
grade rubber tackifier necessary for most tire production.33 The complainant, SI 
Group, Inc., and multiple respondents from China, Hong Kong, and Canada 
(collectively, Sino Legend) disputed the origin of a chemical manufacture 
process.34 The complaint alleges that an employee who knew the chemical 
process was hired away by a competitor, and, subsequently, Sino Legend 
applied for a Chinese patent application, thus publishing the “secret” to the 
world.35 The more than sixty-page complaint includes facts stretching back to 
2004, and SI Group claims the formula took over a quarter of a century and 
substantial resources to develop.36 
Should SI Group’s substantial investment be destroyed because of public 
disclosure? No.37 The law allows SI Group to recover damages only against the 
  
 30 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGATING THE 
THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 1, 4 (2013) (misappropriator caught stealing trade secrets 
worth $50 million); id. at 5 ($400 million). 
 31 See Pace, supra note 16, at 439–40 n.44 (defining four factors rational parties 
weigh, including eventual disclosure, but finding that reasonable companies ignore some 
of other the additional factors, resulting in downstream effects—the financial losses 
following unauthorized disclosure—dominating the judgment equation on whether trade 
secrets give worthwhile protection); see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, 
SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84–85 (3d ed. 1950) (arguing an economy’s growth wholly 
depends on incentives and ability to innovate). 
 32 Certain Rubber Resins and Processes for Manufacturing Same Institution of 
Investigation Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1337, 77 Fed. Reg. 38,083-01 (June 26, 2012). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 But see Group One v. Hallmark Cards, 254 F.3d 1041, 1051–52 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(finding under a “property” theory that PCT publication destroyed secrecy and thus no 
trade secret existed). 
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misappropriating company who published the secret, Sino Legend.  Sino Legend 
certainly does not have the resources to cover, nor should it be responsible for, 
all of the damage resulting from competition from all other market actors in the 
field. SI Group’s many competitors, on the other hand, will be allowed to 
continue to use SI Group’s once-secret process, thereby destroying SI Group’s 
competitive advantage. Even if Sino Legend had the resources to “cover” all of 
the loss of competitive value for the disclosure, and even if such damage could 
be calculated, forcing Sino Legend to pay all of the damages for their 
wrongdoing would shift the loss entirely away from third parties, giving them no 
incentive to not simply jump on the first disclosure and reap an unremitted 
windfall. 
The “tragedy of the commons” should not be allowed to rule. Courts and 
the U.S. International Trade Commission should (and can) order prospective 
exclusion orders to allow companies investing in property to retain the economic 
benefit of that investment. 
Regarding retroactivity, a hybrid trade secrets approach recognizes that 
worldwide instantaneous publishing renders financial and injunctive relief only 
between parties in privity wholly insufficient, particularly when measuring the 
timelines in court against the nanoseconds of the modern marketplace. Indeed, 
by analogy scholars have argued persuasively in the Federal context that a 
modified federal version of trade secrets38 would more appropriately balance and 
reward substantial investment in secret innovation, something Professor Jonas 
Anderson of American University, Washington College of Law has recently 
advocated in his article, Secret Inventions.39 Indeed, “in a private market 
economy, individuals will generally not invest in invention or creation unless the 
expected return from doing so exceeds the cost of doing so,” i.e., the investment 
will result in a profit.40 
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: A HYBRID RELATIONSHIP/PROPERTY 
THEORY 
A hybrid approach, on the other hand, protects investment and innovation 
better, sweeps wider, and rewards more fully the socially beneficial use of 
capital than either the relationship or property theory alone. A hybrid theory 
considers both the individual wrong being compensated—the tort or contract 
violation—and the secret subject matter destroyed—the property right. By 
recognizing both, courts and scholars can apply the existing frameworks more 
effectively thereby rewarding rights to innovators against third parties. The 
  
 38 See, e.g., Pace, supra note 16. 
 39 J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 956–75 (2011) 
(supporting a “choice” regime whereby patents and trade secrets may complement one 
another, and advocating for a “secret invention registry” and other forms of tangibly 
fixing trade secrets in advance of any potential misappropriation). 
 40 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031, 1054 (2005). 




hybrid approach thus emphasizes the importance of protecting the trade secret 
owner’s innovation investment by analyzing the nexus between the secret and 
the initial misappropriation, and offering the possibility of widespread 
prospective exclusion against third parties after misappropriation. 
The cases of Smith v. Dravo Corp.41 and ILG Industries v. Scott42 support 
this argument. In Dravo, the defendant obtained through a confidential 
relationship, knowledge of the plaintiff’s rather ingenious interlocking shipping 
container design. Applying a Restatement-like analysis under Pennsylvania law, 
the court ruled for the plaintiff, rewarding the substantial investment in the 
innovation, while remarking that the container design was not an “invention” per 
se and could have been easily reverse-engineered from public models.  
Under a traditional property theory, this lack of outright secrecy—i.e., the 
relative ease of reverse-engineering—would have been fatal to the plaintiff’s 
claim. Indeed, the court had difficulty identifying the subject matter being 
protected, and whether Smith made reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy 
(given the ease of reverse-engineering). A conjunctive analysis requiring those 
two factors would have precluded the plaintiff from recouping substantial 
investment in the shipping containers. Instead, while the court said that 
“confidential business information is not given protection merely as a reward to 
its accumulator,”43 the court ostensibly applied a relationship theory of trade 
secrets, finding a violation. The court held that the bad actions of the defendant 
merited punishment under “the general principle that intentionally inflicted harm 
is actionable unless privileged.”44  
Had the relationship not existed between parties, e.g., the designs were 
stolen and published on the internet, should the plaintiff have not been entitled 
to reasonable prospective protection of his investment? Under the hybrid 
approach, the lack of secrecy would not destroy the claim. Instead, a court could 
allow the plaintiff to enjoin others from making or using the invention for a 
limited period of time given that the disclosure occurred against his will, and he 
had yet to recoup his investment fully. Courts would enjoy powers in equity that 
would allow them to exclude others from making or using the secret.  
Similarly, in ILG Industries v. Scott,45 defendants were enjoined from 
using certain drawings of “industrial fan designs” obtained through improper 
means despite the ability to ascertain those designs from commercially available 
  
 41 Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953) (“Pennsylvania will not 
deny recovery merely because the design could have been obtained through inspection.”). 
Contra Van Prods. v. Gen. Welding & Fabricating, 213 A.2d 769, 779 (Pa. 1965) 
(rejecting Dravo’s equitable relationship theory in favor of a pure property theory). 
 42 ILG Industries, Inc. v. Scott, 49 Ill. 2d 88, 89–95 (1971). 
 43 Dravo, 202 F.2d at 375. 
 44 Id. (quoting Note, Protection and Use of Trade Secrets, 64 HARV. L. REV. 976, 978 
(1951)). 
 45 At the time this case was decided, Illinois was also a Restatement jurisdiction. 
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information.46 The court enjoined the defendants from using those designs and 
also enjoined them from delivering or selling any component built on 
information derived from those designs.47 Affording prospective exclusion akin 
to a patent right makes sense in the context of trade secrets misappropriated and 
purposefully passed to third parties. Those third parties would otherwise benefit 
from the bad actions of others, providing an incentive to seek out bad actors 
such as disgruntled employees to misappropriate trade secrets for them. ILG 
Industries illustrates that the hybrid approach would stop third parties from 
skirting liability and experiencing a windfall at the expense of the innovator. 
Rather than holding that no secret existed, the court granted a limited 
exclusion order (similar to ITC exclusion orders or rights given to patent 
owners), not with the intent to allow the defendants to recoup their hard-earned 
competitive advantage, but rather to compensate them for the wrong committed 
against them.48 “What in reality is protected in cases of this nature is not the 
product or process, but the secrecy of it [. . .] Commercial morality is preserved 
by preventing one from wrongfully using secret information for a period of time 
no longer than that required to discover or reproduce that information by lawful 
means.”49 While I agree with the outcome, I find the reasoning flawed. Why 
should the outcome differ if the information had been stolen and published by a 
party not in privity with the plaintiff? The court’s reasoning does not address the 
property value of the secret itself, and thus allows third parties to benefit from 
the wrong of another without protecting the investment of the innovator. 
These cases provide support for the basic provision found in 
Metallurgical Industries v. Fourtek, Inc.: “[A] trade secret can exist in a 
combination of characteristics and components each of which, by itself, is in the 
public domain, but the unified process, design and operation of which in unique 
combination, affords a competitive advantage and is a protectible secret.”50 
Thus, even a currently public, non-secret innovation can (and should) 
qualify for trade secret protection if the company attempted, but failed,51 to keep 
that valuable information secret. Under the hybrid property/relationship 
approach, parties could protect secret inventions made public, while not 
necessarily requiring relationships between the owners of trade secret inventions 
and the bad actors. 
These cases pay lip service to relationship reasoning, but hold more in 
line with protecting substantial investment in the research and development of 
intellectual property.  Compare these cases with a Minnesota court’s erroneous 
  
 46 ILG Industries, 49 Ill.2d at 89–95. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 97 (citing Jones v. Ulrich, 95 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950)). 
 50 Metallurgical Industries Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1202 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(citing Sikes v. McGraw-Edison Co., 665 F.2d 731, 736 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
 51 By “failed,” I mean to imply that if, despite best efforts, a secret was still 
misappropriated (which is almost always the case in court) they should not be punished 
by the mere fact of the crime. 




holding in Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc.52 This case involved 
an employee who left Electro-Craft Corp. and took the company’s brushless 
electro servo-motors invention with him.53 He entered into direct competition 
with his former company by producing the same brushless motors, using the 
same method of manufacture, and even employing the same business model.54  
The Minnesota court, adopting the strict “property view,”55 also paid lip 
service, correctly, to the dual-nature of trade secrets, before brushing it aside: 
We recognize that the confidential relationship is also a prerequisite to an 
action for misappropriation . . . and that the elements of trade secret status 
and the confidentiality of the relationship “should not be artificially sepa-
rated for purposes of analysis since, in a significant sense, they are inter-
dependent.” However, without the finding of a trade secret, we cannot 
grant relief to ECC. Otherwise this court would come dangerously close to 
expanding the trade secrets act into a catchall for industrial torts.56 
Strictly applying the UTSA categories of property, including secrecy, the 
court reversed the lower court, finding the trade secrets unprotectable despite the 
presence of a confidential relationship and substantial investment in the 
property’s development.57 The court found only that Electro-Craft had not taken 
“reasonable efforts” to maintain secrecy.58 
This unfortunate result could have been avoided had the court applied a 
hybrid approach, taking into consideration the confidential relationship and the 
substantial, years-long business investment in the innovation. Thus, a showing 
of substantial initial investment could outweigh the inadequacy of measures 
taken to keep the property secret. The hybrid approach adequately balances the 
many underlying factors behind trade secret protection and affords companies 
and individuals added incentive to innovate by offering both pre- and post- trade 
secret disclosure protection. 
CONCLUSION 
The advances of modern technology coupled with inadequate trade secret 
enforcement and protection demand a new hybrid property/relationship 
approach to trade secret law. A hybrid theory would grant trade secret owners 
prospective protection of publicly disclosed trade secrets against third parties. 
Parties that obtain a trade secret “innocently” (i.e., without misappropriation) via 
  
 52 Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 904 (Minn. 1983). 
 53 Id. at 890–92. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 897 (“In defining the existence of a trade secret as the threshold issue, we first 
focus upon the “property rights” in the trade secret rather than on the existence of a 
confidential relationship.”). 
 56 Id. (citations omitted). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
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publication should not reap a windfall; courts should protect the investment in 
the original right as against the world. Only then can the legal system 
appropriately balance the costs and benefits of substantial investment in 
innovation against the ability to compete in the marketplace. It is the only 
answer in the Internet age. 
